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Does One Size Fit All? Why Our Genes Show the
Need for Tailor-Made Solutions
JACK HAISMAN†
Since the human genome was first sequenced in 2003, millions of consumers and medical
professionals have swarmed the field of medical genetics, seeking to peer into the crystal ball
and see what their own, or their patients’, futures may hold. Also rushing in are direct-toconsumer genetic testing companies like 23andMe and AncestryDNA, which can circumvent
medical privacy laws by offering genetic testing without a medical provider.
Medical privacy regulations, such as the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (HIPAA), the Genetic Information Discrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), and those
promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission, do not regulate these companies adequately for
a litany of reasons. These loopholes and shortcomings in regulation leave American consumers
substantially less protected, less medically informed, and in some instances can jeopardize
national security.
This Note proposes that Congress should enact legislation overhauling the current regulatory
regime in at least three ways: (1) the “covered entity” approach should be abandoned and
replaced with a data-driven model; (2) the Safe Harbor provision of HIPAA should explicitly
exclude genomic data; and (3) consumers should be given a “right to be forgotten” and compel
companies to delete their data. These reforms would significantly strengthen consumers’ genetic
privacy and give them an escape hatch to safeguard the core of their identity.

† J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Senior Production Editor, Hastings Law
Journal. I would first like to thank my family and friends for their unwavering support. I am also incredibly
grateful to Professor Chimène Keitner for her guidance and encouragement. I would also like to thank Dr.
Gregory Idos and Christine Hong for their mentorship and for planting the seeds of this Note. Lastly, this Note
would not have been possible without the editors of the Hastings Law Journal and their hard work.
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INTRODUCTION
When you decide to test for ‘future risk,’ you are also, inevitably, asking
yourself, what kind of future am I willing to risk?
— Siddhartha Mukherjee1
The human genome was first sequenced in 2003.2 Since then, consumers
and medical professionals alike have swarmed the field of medical genetics,
seeking to peer into the crystal ball and see what their own, or their patients’,
futures may hold. Rushing in on this hot field of scientific advancement are
companies that seek to circumvent medical practitioners and sell this crystal ball
themselves. These are, of course, direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies
such as 23andMe and Ancestry.com—nearly ubiquitous names.3 However, in
circumventing licensed professionals who have taken an oath to do no harm to
their patients, these companies avoid federal privacy laws regarding medical
recordkeeping. The result? American consumers are substantially less protected
and less medically informed, and in some instances, may jeopardize national
security. In fact, both the Food and Drug Administration and the Center for
Disease Control explicitly refuse to recommend direct-to-consumer genetic tests
as a suitable alternative to a traditional evaluation by an individual’s healthcare
provider.4 Moreover, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) explicitly warns
consumers of the privacy implications of direct-to-consumer genetic testing.5
Furthermore, the United States Department of Defense has expressly warned
service members of the privacy harms surrounding this method of testing.6 In a
memorandum, Joseph Kernan, the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence,
warned:
These DTC [direct-to-consumer] genetic tests are largely unregulated and
could expose personal and genetic information, and potentially create
unintended security consequences . . . . Moreover, there is increased concern
in the scientific community that outside parties are exploiting the use of

1. SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE GENE: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 438 (2016).
2. Human Genome Project Information Archive 1990–2003, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://
www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/Human_Genome/project/whydoe.shtml (last modified Mar. 26, 2019).
3. This Note will treat 23andMe and the other top four direct-to-consumer companies as a proxy for the
entire industry, as they command a sizable majority of the market and are the pioneers of the business model.
4. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Tests, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER INFO. (Feb. 2018),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0166-direct-consumer-genetic-tests [https://web.archive.org/web/20210
323011005/https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0166-direct-consumer-genetic-tests].
5. Lesley Fair, DNA Test Kits: Consider the Privacy Implications, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER
INFO. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/12/dna-test-kits-consider-privacy-implications
[https://web.archive.org/web/20210702090536/https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/12/dna-test-kitsconsider-privacy-implications].
6. Shawn Snow, Pentagon Advises Troops to Not Use Consumer DNA Kits, Citing Security Risks, MIL.
TIMES (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.militarytimes.com/2019/12/24/pentagon-advises-troops-to-not-useconsumer-dna-kits-citing-security-risks/.
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genetic data for questionable purposes, including mass surveillance and the
ability to track individuals without their authorization or awareness.7

This Note examines the deficiencies in our current federal regulatory
regime for genetic privacy and proposes ways to improve consumer privacy
without sacrificing scientific advancement. Part I surveys the background of
genetic privacy, including: the scientific basis of genetics, why sharing genetic
information is important for innovation, how and what direct-to-consumer
companies test for, and why those companies raise novel issues in the privacy
and regulatory spaces. Part II describes the current regulatory background—
which includes the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), the Genetic Information Discrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), and the
FTC rules—and their shortcomings. Finally, Part III proposes ideas for
overcoming the current shortcomings in regulation and strengthening individual
privacy rights. These solutions include overhauling HIPAA’s current “covered
entity” approach by abandoning the fallacy that what makes us fundamentally
unique can be de-identified, and enacting a right to be forgotten. These reforms
would greatly increase consumer genetic privacy through a top-down approach
directly regulating direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies and would
empower consumers in the face of unforeseeable risks.
I. BACKGROUND
A. GENETICS DECODED: FROM PEA PLANTS TO BESPOKE MEDICINE
In the mid-nineteenth century, an Austrian monk named Gregor Mendel
cultivated a pea garden in an abbey that became the genesis for modern
genetics.8 In this garden, Mendel experimented with how different traits—such
as flower color, pod shape, flower position, and stem length—are passed from
one generation to the next.9 The prevailing theory of the time was a blending
theory, wherein inheritable material from both parents is mixed, similar to how
blue and yellow paint mix to make green.10 Mendel disproved that theory and
instead proffered a particulate theory, wherein hereditary factors––now
commonly known as genes––are shuffled like a deck of cards and passed from
generation to generation undiluted.11 This idea forms the basis for the modern
understanding of genetics, and interest in heritable traits has since grown
exponentially.
7. Memorandum from Joseph D. Kernan, Under Sec’y of Def. for Intel. & James N. Stewart, Assistant
Sec’y of Def. for Manpower & Rsrv. Affs. (Dec. 20, 2019) (on file with author).
8. LISA A. URRY, MICHAEL L. CAIN, STEVEN A. WASSERMAN, PETER V. MINORSKY & JANE B. REECE,
CAMPBELL BIOLOGY 269–70 (Beth N. Winickoff et al. eds., 11th ed. 2016).
9. Id. at 269–72.
10. Id. at 269.
11. Id.
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Today, our understanding of the basis for inheritable traits has come very
far from Mendel’s hereditary factors. We now know that the hereditary factors
we pass on are twenty-three pairs of chromosomes, one from each parent.12 Each
chromosome is made up of anywhere from hundreds to thousands of genes.13
Humans are composed of 30,000 genes, which are long sequences of
deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA.14 DNA is a double helical polymer comprised
of four different types of nucleotide bases: adenine (A), thymine (T), guanine
(G), and cytosine (C).15 The specific sequence of these nucleotides is what
allows for the incredible variety of genes, and the entirety of the sequence of all
three billion nucleotide bases is what constitutes the human genome.16
However, DNA and genes are more than just a random sequence of
nucleotide bases; they provide the blueprint and instructions for how to
synthesize all proteins, controlling everything from our metabolism to our skin
color, and even our risk of developing cancer.17 The manifestation of the genetic
code is called gene expression and can be divided into the genotype, or genetic
makeup, and its phenotype, or physical manifestation.18 Additionally, traits can
be classified as single gene (such as a Widow’s Peak hairline and influenced by
only one gene), or polygenic (such as eye color and influenced by multiple
genes).19
This distinction between underlying genes and their resulting phenotype is
important because there is an immense amount of genetic variation, or
polymorphisms, between individuals.20 No two humans, besides identical twins
(and triplets, quadruplets, etc.), will ever be genetically identical.21 However,
any two humans’ DNA differs by about one in a thousand nucleotides, which
means there is a 99.9% similarity of DNA from person to person.22 Not all
polymorphisms, also called mutations, lead to obvious downstream effects (e.g.,
silent mutations).23 But some can cause serious genetic illnesses like

12. Id. at 235–36.
13. Human Genome Project FAQ, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/humangenome-project/Completion-FAQ [hereinafter Human Genome Project] (last updated Feb. 24, 2020).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. DNA Sequencing Fact Sheet, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/aboutgenomics/fact-sheets/DNA-Sequencing-Fact-Sheet (last updated Aug. 16, 2020).
18. URRY ET AL., supra note 8, at 274.
19. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Understanding Human Genetic Variation: How Much Genetic Variation
Exists Among Humans?, in NIH CURRICULUM SUPPLEMENT SERIES (2007) (ebook), http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK20363/ [hereinafter Understanding Human Genetic Variation].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Jennifer Cacchio, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You: The Legal Risk of Peering into the Gene Pool
with Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 87 UMKC L. REV. 219, 221 (2018).
23. Understanding Human Genetic Variation, supra note 19.
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Huntington’s Disease, while others can confer protection against infectious
diseases, like a mutation in the CCR5 gene that confers protection against the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) retrovirus.24
Understanding genetic variation is important because it is arguably one of
the most prescient indicators for fighting disease. Nearly every human disease
has a genetic component, from cystic fibrosis to diabetes, heart disease and
cancer.25 Cancer, the second leading cause of death in the United States, is
caused by an accumulation of genetic polymorphisms in a cell.26 Additionally,
there are some germline genetic mutations that can greatly increase an
individual’s risk of developing cancer.27 For example, only 13% of women in
the general population will develop breast cancer, but 55–72% of women with
BRCA1 mutations will develop breast cancer by age seventy or eighty.28
Outside of genetic status, an important distinction in the field of medical
genetics is whether a mutation is somatic, germline, or de novo. Somatic
mutations are those that occur after birth but are not present in any germ cells—
such as egg cells or sperm.29 Germline mutations are those present in
reproductive cells that are inherited from generation to generation and are
incorporated into every cell of the individual.30 De novo mutations, meaning
“from the beginning” in Latin, are those that occur during gametogenesis—the
process in which females and males make eggs and sperm—and thus are present
in the child but not the parent.31 These critical distinctions determine whether a
potentially deleterious (i.e., pathogenic) mutation is inheritable and thus affects
an entire family or only the individual tested. Such distinctions also mean that
your genetic test results reflect not only your own genetic makeup, but also those
of your mother, father, sibling, cousins, and even more distant relatives. In
addition to deleterious mutations, there are also variants of unknown
significance (VUS), wherein the mutation’s effect on clinical disposition is
unknown, and silent mutations, wherein there is no discernible impact on clinical

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Leif W. Ellisen & Daniel A. Haber, Basics Principles of Cancer Genetics, in PRINCIPLES OF CLINICAL
CANCER GENETICS: A HANDBOOK FROM THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL 1, 1 (Daniel C. Chung &
Daniel A. Haber eds., 2010).
27. See generally id.
28. BRCA Gene Mutations: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-prevention/genetics/brca-fact-sheet (last updated Nov. 19, 2020).
29. Somatic Variant, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/geneticsdictionary/def/somatic-variant (last visited July 31, 2022).
30. Germline Mutation, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/geneticsdictionary/def/germline-mutation (last visited July 31, 2022).
31. De Novo Mutation, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.cancer.gov/publications/dictionaries/geneticsdictionary/def/de-novo-mutation (last visited July 31, 2022).
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disposition.32 This scientific theory and terminology is the backdrop for
understanding the clinical impact of genetic tests.
1. Genetic Testing in Action: Angelina Jolie’s Story
Our genes can be described in a variety of metaphors, such as the blueprint
for protein formation or alternatively, as the user manual for our construction
and operation.33 If our genes are a manual, a genetic test represents the Rosetta
Stone for reading our genetic code.34 To illustrate this, let’s look to the BRCA1
gene, which encodes a protein involved in repairing DNA after it has been
damaged (such as after a sunburn).35 Because cancer is merely an accumulation
of genetic mutations over time that result in cellular dysfunction (i.e., tumors),36
a failure for adequate DNA repair (e.g., due to a dysfunctional mutation in
BRCA1) can result in an 80% lifetime risk of developing breast cancer.37
Additionally, BRCA1 mutations are typically germline mutations that are passed
from parent to child.38 Because of this hereditability and heightened risk,
families with a BRCA1 mutation typically have numerous members that have
battled cancer.39
Angelina Jolie is one such example.40 Her mother had died at fifty-six from
breast cancer, and Jolie’s children would ask if the same could happen to her.41
In fact, Jolie received a genetic test for BRCA1 because of her heightened risk
for developing cancer.42 The BRCA1 test came back with a deleterious
mutation.43 Her doctors estimated Jolie had an eighty-seven percent risk for
developing breast cancer and a fifty percent risk for developing ovarian cancer.44
Because of this astronomical risk, her medical team, who also administered the
genetic test, recommended that she embark on a three-month surgical journey to

32. See Romy L.S. Mesman, Fabienne M.G.R. Calléja, Giel Hendriks, Bruno Morolli, Branislav Misovic,
Peter Devilee, Christi J. van Asperen, Harry Vrieling & Maaike P.G. Vreeswijk, The Functional Impact of
Variants of Uncertain Significance in BRCA2, 21 GENETICS MED. 293, 293 (2019).
33. Adrian Woolfson, A Genetic Pandora’s Box, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2017, 1:41 PM), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/a-genetic-pandoras-box-1489171299.
34. See id.
35. Simon N. Powell & Lisa A. Kachnic, Roles of BRCA1 and BRCA2 in Homologous Recombination,
DNA Replication Fidelity and the Cellular Response to Ionizing Radiation, 22 ONCOGENE 5784, 5784 (2003).
36. Ellisen & Haber, supra note 26.
37. Powell & Kachnic, supra note 35.
38. Id. The exception are de novo mutations, wherein the deleterious mutation occurs during
gametogenesis and thus is only present in the next generation. NAT’L CANCER INST., supra note 29.
39. See Powell & Kachnic, supra note 35.
40. See generally Angelina Jolie, Opinion, My Medical Choice, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/opinion/my-medical-choice.html.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.

1768

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:6

undergo a preventative double mastectomy removing all breast tissue.45 This
procedure reduced her risk of breast cancer to five percent.46
Unfortunately, Angelina Jolie’s story is not a one-off. Hereditary cancers
(i.e., those driven by germline mutations) represent approximately 10% of the
estimated 19.3 million worldwide cancer cases in 2020.47 For many people,
obtaining genetic testing is a way to safeguard their health by evaluating their
risk of future illness.
B. THE SHARING PARADOX: KNOWING MORE BY HAVING MORE
In order for genetic test results to hold any meaning, scientists and
researchers must know each gene’s function. There are over 30,000 genes
composed of more than three billion base pairs in every human genome.48 By
compiling large amounts of genetic data, scientists can study genetic correlations
between a mutation’s presence and disease progression.49
The cost of human genome sequencing has significantly decreased since
its inception. In 2003, sequencing an entire genome cost $2.7 billion.50 Now it
is less than $1,000.51 Sequencing can even be performed overnight.52 Thus, the
field of genetics has become more accessible because of this rapid drop in cost.
This accessibility has evolved from the realm of research scientists to the realm
of everyday consumers—through both direct-to-consumer offerings and testing
through medical providers. Increased access has consequently led to the
evaluation of over twelve million genomes.53 With such a substantial rise in

45. Id. She would later go on to have a bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy (i.e., removal of both ovaries and
fallopian tubes) to reduce her risk of ovarian cancer. Alice Park, Why Angelina Jolie Chose to Have Her Ovaries
Removed, TIME (Mar. 24, 2015, 6:30 PM), https://time.com/3756167/angelina-jolie-ovaries-removed-cancer/.
46. Jolie, supra note 40.
47. Hyuna Sung, Jacques Ferlay, Rebecca L. Siegel, Matthieu Laversanne, Isabelle Soerjomataram,
Ahmedin Jemal & Freddie Bray, Global Cancer Statistics 2020: GLOBOCAN Estimates of Incidence and
Mortality Worldwide for 36 Cancers in 185 Countries, 71 CA: CANCER J. FOR CLINICIANS 209, 209 (2021)
(discussing the worldwide prevalence of cancer in 2021); Fawz S. AlHarthi, Alya Qari, Alaa Edress & Malak
Abedalthagafi, Familial/Inherited Cancer Syndrome: A Focus on the Highly Consanguineous Arab Population,
3 NPJ GENOMIC MED. 1, 1 (2020) (describing the prevalence of hereditary cancer syndromes both worldwide and
in particular populations).
48. See Human Genome Project, supra note 13.
49. See generally Jeroen R. Huyghe et al., Discovery of Common and Rare Genetic Risk Variants for
Colorectal Cancer, 51 NATURE GENETICS 76 (2019).
50. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 2; The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, NAT’L HUM. GENOME
RSCH.
INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/fact-sheets/Sequencing-Human-Genome-cost
[hereinafter The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome] (last updated Nov. 1, 2021).
51. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 2; The Cost of Sequencing a Human Genome, supra note 50.
52. Jon Gertner, Unlocking the Covid Code, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes
.com/interactive/2021/03/25/magazine/genome-sequencing-covid-variants.html?searchResultPosition=1.
53. See Mwenza Blell & M.A. Hunter, Direct-to-Consumer Testing’s Red Herring: “Genetic Ancestry”
and Personalized Medicine, 6 FRONTIERS MED. 1, 1 (2019).
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testing, there is a corresponding rapid increase in the amount of data that exists,
leaving scientists with the evolving issue of how to analyze that data.
A solution to this problem is using computer algorithms and analytics.54
Looking back to the previous Subpart, there are generally three types of
polymorphisms in the realm of genetic counseling (i.e., using genomic
information to counsel medical decision-making):55 deleterious mutations (i.e.,
those that increase the risk of genetic illness), variants of unknown significance
(i.e., variants whose clinical outcomes are unknown), and silent mutations (i.e.,
those whose clinical outcomes are negligible).56
To simplify an incredibly complex sector of computer science, algorithms
and analytics use large amounts of data to find correlations between
polymorphisms (i.e., genetic variations between individuals) and disease
outcomes.57 To illustrate this, a recent study in Nature Genetics identified forty
new “associations” between variants and an increased genetic risk of colorectal
cancer.58 But researchers needed to analyze 31.8 million genetic variations in
order to identify those new associations.59 It is important to note that this study
was looking specifically for rare and low-frequency variations, but the lesson is
nonetheless the same; in order to continue making novel discoveries about the
role our genetics play in disease association and progression, a large amount of
information needs to be compiled and subsequently analyzed.60
The easiest and best way to learn more about the genome is to analyze more
data. The only way to acquire more genomic data is to sequence more
individuals’ genes and, potentially, their entire genome. This means that any
potential regulation regarding genetic information must necessarily balance the
competing interests in sharing and adequately protecting the consumer from
unauthorized use and disclosure. On this balancing act, Eric Green, director of
the U.S. National Human Genome Research Institute said, “[o]ne value is to
make the data as widely available and unencumbered as possible, but then you’re
trading that off against concerns about how data is being used, and maintaining
privacy and confidentiality . . . . We’re constantly exploring models that put us
between those two extremes.”61 This presents a significant paradox for the field

54. See Shital Shah & Andrew Kusiak, Cancer Gene Search with Data-Mining and Genetic Algorithms,
37 COMPUTS. BIOLOGY & MED. 251, 253 (2007).
55. See supra Part I.A.
56. See supra Part I.A.
57. See generally Shah & Kusiak, supra note 54. For an in-depth look at another method of genomic data
analysis, see generally Jae K. Lee, Paul D. Williams & Sooyoung Cheon, Data Mining in Genomics, 28 CLINICS
LAB’Y MED. 145 (2008).
58. Huyghe et al., supra note 49.
59. Id.
60. See generally id.; see also Shah & Kusiak, supra note 54.
61. Erika Check Hayden, The Genome Hacker, 497 NATURE 172, 174 (2013).

1770

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:6

of genetics: the only way to learn more about the genome is to have more data,
amplifying privacy and confidentiality concerns.
C. GENETIC TESTING, FROM TRAINED PROFESSIONALS TO CONSUMERS:
DEMOCRATIZATION OR EXPLOITATION?
1.

Direct-to-Consumer Testing Offers an Alternative to Testing
Through Genetic Counselors

Following the genomic revolution (i.e., the sequencing of the human), our
understanding of genetic illness has increased greatly.62 This increased
knowledge has led to an increased interest in medical genetics—the science of
human biological variation as it relates to health and disease—and an integration
of genetics into healthcare decision-making.63 If an individual or their
supervising healthcare practitioner is concerned about potential genetic illness,
their physician would refer them to a genetic counselor and/or a geneticist.64
A genetic counselor is a trained healthcare professional with at least a
master’s degree and is certified by the American Board of Genetic Counseling
(ABGC) to help a patient understand, cope with, and diagnose genetic
illnesses.65 A geneticist is a physician, meaning that they have completed
medical school and residency, that is board-certified by the American Board of
Medical Genetics and Genomics (ABMGG) and specializing in medicine
involving the interactions between genes and health.66 In total, an ABGCcertified genetic counselor has at least six years of post-secondary education
(four years of undergraduate education and two years of graduate education),
whereas an ABMGG board-certified geneticist has at least eleven years of postsecondary education (four years of undergraduate education, four years of
medical school, and three years of genetic residency).67 This advanced education
is important, because genetically informed decision-making affects incredibly
harmful illnesses such as breast and colorectal cancer.68

62. See generally Charles J. Epstein, Medical Genetics in the Genomic Medicine of the 21st Century,
79 AM. J. HUM. GENETICS 434 (2006).
63. Id.
64. See Agnar Helgason & Kári Stefánsson, The Past, Present, and Future of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Tests, 12 DIALOGUES CLINICAL NEUROSCI. 61, 65 (2010).
65. Becoming a Genetic Counselor, NAT’L SOC’Y OF GENETIC COUNS., https://www.nsgc.org
/About/Becoming-a-Genetic-Counselor (last visited July 31, 2022).
66. Medical Genetics and Genomics, AM. BD. OF MED. SPECIALTIES, https://www.abms.org
/board/american-board-of-medical-genetics-and-genomics/ (last visited July 31, 2022).
67. See NAT’L SOC’Y OF GENETIC COUNS., supra note 65 (describing the requirements of a genetic
counselor); see also AM. BD. OF MED. SPECIALTIES, supra note 66 (describing the requirements of a boardcertified geneticist).
68. See generally Mesman et al., supra note 32 (breast cancer); see also Huyghe et al., supra note 49
(colorectal cancer).
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Direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies seek to circumvent these
specialized practitioners by selling genetic tests directly to patients, regardless
of whether they have a medical team in place to deal with the fallout.69 As this
Note will describe at length, direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies
largely evade federal regulations and are not covered by HIPAA. This presents
numerous regulatory challenges and results in unique harms. To understand
these challenges and harms, it is important to first understand the direct-toconsumer genetic testing industry.
2. The Direct-to-Consumer Business Model: Is It Big Tech in a Lab
Coat?
In 2016, 246 different companies offered some form of online DNA test
and served over twelve million individuals users.70 By 2019, more than twentysix million individuals had used the top four direct-to-consumer testing
companies: 23andMe, AncestryDNA (Ancestry.com), FamilyTreeDNA, and
MyHeritage.71 In the two decades this industry has existed, these ventures have
been incredibly lucrative.72 By 2028, the direct-to-consumer genetic testing
market is estimated to exceed $3.4 billion.73
The business model of these companies varies greatly from those of
medical genetics companies.74 First, direct-to-consumer companies have two
main revenue sources: the sales of the tests to consumers and then selling
consumers’ data to secondary companies.75 Second, some companies offer
subscription services wherein consumers pay a yearly fee to have their samples
reanalyzed as new deleterious mutations are identified.76 This business model is
in stark contrast with the medical model, wherein the product price is tied to the
healthcare payment model (i.e., insurance), and any secondary use is mostly
limited to healthcare research purposes.77 The medical model is possible because

69. See Blell & Hunter, supra note 53.
70. See id.
71. Antonio Regalado, More than 26 Million People Have Taken an At-Home Ancestry Test, MIT TECH.
REV. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/02/11/103446/more-than-26-million-peoplehave-taken-an-at-home-ancestry-test/.
72. Sumant Ugalmugle & Rupali Swain, DTC Genetic Testing Market to Exceed US $3.4 Bn by 2028,
GLOB. MKT. INSIGHTS (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.gminsights.com/pressrelease/direct-to-consumer
-dtc-genetic-testing-market [https://web.archive.org/web/20210615124651/https://www.gminsights.com/press
release/direct-to-consumer-dtc-genetic-testing-market].
73. Id.
74. See Megan Allyse, David Robinson, Matthew Ferber & Richard Sharp, Direct-to-Consumer Testing
2.0: Emerging Models of Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing, 93 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 113, 120 (2018).
75. Id. at 115.
76. See, e.g., Compare 23andMe DNA Test Kits, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/compare-dnatests/?gnav=gv1 (last visited July 31, 2022).
77. Allyse et al., supra note 74, at 115.
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the HIPAA largely prevents the commercialization of patient health data.78 The
implications of these two revenue streams will occur in turn.
The first revenue stream is selling the genetic tests to the consumer. These
tests are simple: a consumer buys a test online, receives a kit in the mail, collects
the DNA sample in their home and mails it back.79 These tests are as low as
$99.80 The company then analyzes the consumer’s DNA and sends the consumer
individualized results.81 From a business perspective, this revenue stream is
straightforward and similar to any other product-driven business model.
The second revenue stream, selling access to data, is more complicated. In
general, DNA associations are made by associating particular polymorphisms
with a particular outcome.82 In the medical context, particular polymorphisms
are associated with particular disease outcomes. In the ancestral context,
particular polymorphisms are associated with particular ethnic groups with
strong geographic ties and little migration.83
As was necessary in the colorectal cancer association study analyzing 31.8
million polymorphisms, these companies need to amass an incredible amount of
data in order to deliver on their promises to consumers.84 23andMe has amassed
a repository of over two million individual genomes, and Ancestry.com, a
company that started as a genealogy magazine, has amassed over five million
DNA profiles.85 By January 2019, the top four direct-to-consumer genetic
testing companies—23andMe, AncestryDNA, FamilyTreeDNA, and
MyHeritage—amassed more than twenty-six million individuals’ genetic
profiles.86
Notably, it is not just the companies that administer genetic testing that
have amassed large repositories of genetic profiles; companies that merely find
associations (i.e., finding links between individuals’ various polymorphisms)
also exist.87 One such company, GEDmatch, created a product that allows
78. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501, 164.508(a)(3) (2020); see also Marketing, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS. (Apr. 3, 2003), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/marketing/index.html
[hereinafter Marketing].
79. Andelka M. Phillips, ‘Only a Click Away — DTC Genetics for Ancestry, Health, Love . . . and More:
A View of the Business and Regulatory Landscape’, 8 APPLIED & TRANSLATIONAL GENOMICS 16, 16 (2016).
80. 23ANDME, supra note 76.
81. How it Works, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/howitworks/?gnav=gv1 (last visited July 31,
2022).
82. See Shah & Kusiak, supra note 54, at 251.
83. Id. at 1 (discussing the medical outcome association); Blell & Hunter, supra note 53, at 2 (discussing
ancestral association).
84. See Huyghe et al., supra note 49, at 76, 82.
85. Catherine Arcabascio, A Genetic Surveillance State: Are We One Buccal Swab Away from a Total Loss
of Genetic Privacy?, 63 HOW. L.J. 117, 123 (2020).
86. Id.; Regalado, supra note 71.
87. Arcabascio, supra note 85; see also Heather Murphy, What You’re Unwrapping When You Get a DNA
Test for Christmas, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/22/science/dna-testing-kitpresent.html.
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individuals to upload their genetic information procured from other genetic
testing companies like 23andMe and Ancestry.com to potentially find new
relatives.88 GEDmatch was able to amass over 1.3 million genetic profiles before
the company’s shutdown due to a data breach that leaked users’ genetic
information to law enforcement.89
Not only is the aggregated genomic data important for making decisions
regarding the status and phenotype of certain polymorphisms, but selling access
to that underlying data is also incredibly valuable.90 In February 2015, 23andMe
sold access to its aggregate genomic information to Genentech for
$60,000,000.91 23andMe has also signed deals with Pfizer and twelve other
entities for an undisclosed price.92 In 2018, the company announced that
GlaxoSmithKline, one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies, will
invest $300,000,000 into 23andMe and gain exclusive rights to mine customer
data for potential drug targets.93 These are just a few examples from a single
company, and not even the company with the largest aggregated database
(AncestryDNA). It should be noted that AncestryDNA, through its privacy
agreement, has a “perpetual, royalty-free, worldwide, transferable license to use
[a consumer’s] DNA.”94 This industry is expanding exponentially in both the
amount of data created and the money being made.

88. Murphy, supra note 87.
89. Id. It should be noted that given the free nature of the upload, law enforcement already had near
unfettered access to the company’s database and had utilized it numerous times to find the relatives of DNA
samples in criminal cases, most notably in the 2018 Golden State Killer. Zach Whittaker, GEDmatch Confirms
Data Breach After Users’ DNA Profile Data Made Available to Police, TECH CRUNCH (July 22, 2020, 10:01
AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/07/22/gedmatch-investigating-dna-profile-law-enforcement/.
90. See Ifeoma Ajunwa, Opinion, There’s No Guarantee of Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/03/02/23andme-and-the-promise-of-anonymous-genetictesting-10/theres-no-guarantee-of-anonymity.
91. Id.; see also Matthew Herper, Surprise! With $60 Million Genentech Deal, 23andMe Has a Business
Plan, FORBES (Jan. 6, 2015, 9:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2015/01/06/surprise-with60-million-genentech-deal-23andme-has-a-business-plan/?sh=3e4696a32be9 [hereinafter Herper, Surprise!].
92. Mark Sullivan, 23andMe Has Signed 12 Other Genetic Data Partnerships Beyond Pfizer and
Genentech, VENTUREBEAT (Jan. 14, 2015, 7:00 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2015/01/14/23andme-has-signed12-other-genetic-data-partnerships-beyond-pfizer-and-genentech/; Caroline Chen, 23andMe Turns Spit into
Dollars in Deal with Pfizer, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 12, 2015, 3:29 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2015-01-12/23andme-gives-pfizer-dna-data-as-startup-seeks-growth.
93. Megan Molteni, 23andMe’s Pharma Deals Have Been the Plan All Along, WIRED (Aug. 3, 2018, 3:28
PM), https://www.wired.com/story/23andme-glaxosmithkline-pharma-deal/; GSK and 23andMe Sign
Agreement to Leverage Genetic Insights for the Development of Novel Medicines, GLAXOSMITHKLINE (July 25,
2018), https://www.gsk.com/en-gb/media/press-releases/gsk-and-23andme-sign-agreement-to-leverage-genetic
-insights-for-the-development-of-novel-medicines/.
94. Deborah C. Peel, Opinion, The Hidden Danger of Do-It-Yourself Genetic Tests, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 16,
2017, 7:20 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/hidden-danger-do-it-yourself-genetic-tests-749475?utm_source
=email&utm_medium=morning_brief&utm_campaign=newsletter&utm_content=read_more&spMailingID=2
668187&spUserID=MzQ4OTU1MjQzODUS1&spJobID=930723861&spReportId=OTMwNzIzODYxS0.
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But enticing customers to a product and then turning around to sell
customer data to third parties is not new. Facebook and Google have
implemented similar business models.95 In fact, those companies’ ties run deeper
than just their similar business models. Google was a substantial initial backer
of 23andMe, and the company was founded by Anne Wojcicki, the ex-wife of
Google co-founder Sergey Brin.96 Additionally, Facebook billionaire Yuri
Milner was an early backer of 23andMe.97 Amnesty International has called both
Facebook’s and Google’s business practices an “assault on privacy.”98
Moreover, expanding this business model to the context of health data collection
by private companies raises unique privacy and regulatory concerns.
D. DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER TESTING RAISES UNIQUE PRIVACY AND
REGULATORY CONCERNS
Genetic testing has the potential to radically change disease progression,
because our genetics play a role in nearly every illness.99 While the direct-toconsumer companies may be off to the races and out of the gates, this is neither
the Kentucky Derby nor a spectacle for all to benefit from. This Triple Crown
presents significant privacy and regulatory concerns, unraised through by other
types of medical data.
This Subpart examines two issues raised by genetic testing. First, it
examines whether consumers are getting a one-time medical metric, or, as the
Sharing Paradox teaches, opening Pandora’s box because with more data comes
more information and the underlying analyte of genetic testing is always the
same—the consumer’s DNA.100 Second, DNA is an immutable characteristic
and generally remains unchanged throughout an entire individual’s life, unlike
most other health metrics like blood pressure or lifestyle choices.101 Moreover,
DNA is what makes each individual fundamentally unique, with no two people
sharing the same genome.102 Current regulation freely allows the sharing of deidentified information; but that begs the question of whether an immutable and

95. Molteni, supra note 93.
96. See generally Google, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 22, 2007).
97. Matthew Herper, 23andMe Nabs Billionaire Yuri Milner as Investor, Cuts Price to $99, FORBES (Dec.
11, 2012, 11:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2012/12/11/23andme-nabs-billionaire-yurimilner-as-investor-cuts-price-to-99/?sh=6b4f8d1137c5.
98. Zoe Schiffer, Facebook and Google Surveillance Is an ‘Assault on Privacy,’ Says Amnesty
International, THE VERGE (Nov. 20, 2019, 7:13 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/11/20/
20974832/facebook-google-surveillance-data-assault-privacy-amnesty-international.
99. Understanding Human Genetic Variation, supra note 19, at 11.
100. See infra Part I.D.1.
101. See generally URRY ET AL., supra note 8, at 269–465 (describing human genetics from its foundational
history to genomic engineering and manipulation).
102. This excludes identical twins and other polyzygotic siblings. Understanding Human Genetic Variation,
supra note 19.
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highly individualized characteristic can ever be truly divorced from that
individual?103
1. Are Consumers Conjuring a Crystal Ball or Opening Pandora’s
Box?
Direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies currently offer a variety of
tests, including: ancestry, future athletic ability, paternity, relatedness, healthrelated tests (e.g., propensity for genetically influenced disease), and even tests
for child talent, matchmaking, and “proving infidelity.”104 One of the largest
direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies, 23andMe, offers over 150
personalized reports ranging from ancestry, breast cancer risk, and whether an
individual is capable of matching a musical pitch.105
However, despite the range of results and tests from these companies, the
underlying analyte (i.e., the substance that was identified, measured, and/or
analyzed) is always the same; it is the individual’s DNA sequence.106 No matter
which segment of DNA is being analyzed for that particular trait, an individual’s
DNA sequence remains the same. To illustrate this, imagine holding a soccer
ball. You may be paying attention only to the black pentagons on the ball or
perhaps counting how many stitches are on it, but you are still holding the same
soccer ball with the same number of stitches. Consequently, no amount of
selective looking can negate the fact that when a company peers into the genome,
they have access to all of the person’s genes.
This is why numerous direct-to-consumer companies warn that a risk of
genetic testing is learning about information that an individual was not initially
looking for.107 23andMe takes the opposite approach and embraces this
unknown by offering a subscription service that allows a consumer’s data to be
continuously reanalyzed as newer tests are implemented.108 Additionally, the
company offers a BRCA test that is not comprehensive and “should not be used
to make medical decisions.”109 However, “should a consumer choose to forgo a
BRCA test on the first run, 23andMe is committed to guiding the consumer
through the landscape of BRCA, regardless of whether or not you choose to
access this report.”110 FamilyTreeDNA, an ancestry website that does not offer
any clinical or diagnostic testing, fully discloses on their website that there is
103. See infra Part I.D.2.
104. Phillips, supra note 79.
105. Health + Ancestry Service, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/dna-health-ancestry (last visited
July 31, 2022).
106. See generally Phillips, supra note 79.
107. AncestryDNA Informed Consent, ANCESTRY, https://www.ancestry.com/dna/lp/informedconsent-v4en#8 (effective July 24, 2018).
108. 23ANDME, supra note 76.
109. See BRCA Genes, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/brca/ (last visited July 31, 2022).
110. Id.
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“no assurance that the raw data of any tests of any kind” can be decoupled from
other types of genetic data when analyzed by a “qualified person.”111
Thus, there is a concern of whether direct-to-consumer companies are
potentially trafficking in medical testing, despite conducting testing for
nonmedical purposes. The U.S. FDA has shared this concern and in 2010
intervened in 23andMe and other direct-to-consumer genetic companies’
practices.112 The FDA intervened because of the belief that the direct-toconsumer genetic tests should be characterized as medical devices, as their
results might be used in clinical decision making.113 In 2017, 23andMe became
the first FDA-approved direct-to-consumer company after receiving approval
for ten of its over 150 tests.114 Therefore, genomic data should be considered as
medical data because the same underlying data is used for all tests, regardless of
FDA approval.
Because genetic data is necessarily medical data, its possession by
nonmedical entities raises questions when it comes to data privacy. Direct-toconsumer genetic testing companies have accrued large amounts of individual
medical data, irrespective of the manner of testing. Accordingly, direct-toconsumer genetic testing companies may be prone to data breaches that can be
catastrophic and unquantifiable in harm. In fact, these companies struggle with
defining the harms associated with a genetic data breach in the informed consent
section. For example, AncestryDNA—a company that does not offer medical or
health testing—lists: the risk of being identified, the risk of having biological
samples lost or stolen, and learning information about the consumer and their
relatives that they do not expect or may make them uncomfortable, such as
health risks.115 Most importantly, the last line warns of additional risks that are
currently unforeseeable.116 23andMe similarly warns that there are additional
risks that are unforeseeable.117

111. Common Questions, FAMILYTREEDNA, https://learn.familytreedna.com/faq (last visited July 31,
2022).
112. Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Faults Companies on Unapproved Genetic Tests, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2010,
at B2 [hereinafter Pollack, F.D.A. Faults Companies].
113. Id.
114. See FDA News Release: FDA Allows Marketing of First Direct-to-Consumer Test That Provides
Genetic Information for Certain Conditions, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 6, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-allows-marketing-first-direct-consumer-testsprovide-genetic-risk-information-certain-conditions. Additionally, as of December 20, 2019, the last time the
FDA website on direct-to-consumer testing approvals was updated, 23andMe is the only direct-to-consumer
genetic testing company to have FDA approval as a health diagnostic. Direct-to-Consumer Tests, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/in-vitro-diagnostics/direct-consumer-tests (last updated
Dec. 20, 2019).
115. ANCESTRY, supra note 107.
116. Id.
117. Research Consent Document, 23ANDME, https://www.23andme.com/about/consent (last visited July
31, 2022).
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The risks of a breach are unforeseeable because, as the Sharing Paradox
teaches, with more data comes more information. When individuals take a
genetic test, regardless of the purpose, they are exchanging medical data, the
results of which can be constantly reinterpreted as more information comes to
light. This begs one question: when a person takes a genetic test, are they peering
into a crystal ball to learn about themselves, or are they opening Pandora’s box?
2. The De-Identification Paradox: Can Our Genes Be Unzipped from
Us?
Those who have watched an episode of CSI, Law & Order, or any law
enforcement procedural know that DNA profiling is widely used in crime scene
analytics from a mere few drops of blood.118 Our blood, which contains our
DNA, is useful because of DNA’s inherently unique and immutable
characteristics.119 As will be discussed in more detail in Part III, current
regulations allow medical data to be shared when it is de-identified, presumably
meaning it will not be traced back to the originating patient.120 However, this
Subpart examines whether all identifying traits can truly be removed from an
individual’s DNA sequence.
Recall from Part I that all individuals’ DNA differ by only about one in
1,000 nucleotides, or 0.1%.121 Because of this relatively small amount of
variability, genomic data is highly distinguishable, and thus identity
confirmation can occur with as few as thirty to eighty single nucleotide
polymorphisms (SNPs) (i.e., variations between individuals).122 Typically,
medical and biometric data is de-identified by removing personally identifiable
information, such as name, location, certain demographic information, and
anything else that can be traced back to the patient.123
Returning to the blood pressure analogy, a de-identified record ready for
sharing may contain the blood pressure, height, weight, age and maybe
demographic information such as smoking habits, alcohol intake, and
geographic region. If that data were shared, it would be impossible to track those

118. See Barbara L. Ley, Natalie Jankowski & Paul R. Brewer, Investigating CSI: Portrayals of DNA
Testing on a Forensic Crime Show and Their Potential Effects, 21 PUB. UNDERSTANDING SCI. 51, 52 (2010).
119. See URRY ET AL., supra note 8, at 269–465.
120. Guidance Regarding Method for De-Identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance with
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/special-topics/de-identification/index.html (last
updated May 31, 2022) [hereinafter Guidance Regarding Method for De-Identification].
121. See supra Part I; Cacchio, supra note 22.
122. Fida K. Dankar, Andrey Ptitsyn & Samar K. Dankar, The Development of Large-Scale De-Identified
Biomedical Databases in the Age of Genomics—Principles and Challenges, 12 HUM. GENOMICS 1, 2 (2018).
123. Justin Banda, Inherently Identifiable: Is It Possible to Anonymize Health and Genetic Data?, INT’L
ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS., https://iapp.org/news/a/inherently-identifiable-is-it-possible-to-anonymize-health-andgenetic-data (last visited July 31, 2022).
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metrics back to any one individual, because those data points are secondary to
the driver of those values (i.e., the individual patient). It is not that simple with
genomic data because the driver of genomic variation is the genetic data itself.
Unlike blood pressure, which is temporal and can change throughout the day
depending on salt intake,124 genomic data is incredibly stable and undergoes very
little change throughout a patient’s lifetime.125 Moreover, genomic data is what
makes an individual fundamentally and molecularly unique.126
For example, in 2013, a researcher at Whitehead Institute, a worldrenowned biomedical research institute, tracked down five randomly selected
individuals from a database that contained only their DNA, age, and state of
residence.127 The researcher was able to not only identify each person, but also
nearly fifty of their relatives.128
In another example, Yaniv Erlich—a computer science professor at
Columbia University and Chief Science Officer of MyHeritage, one of the
largest direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies—discovered in a now
famous study that a genetic database needs to cover only 2% of a target
population in order to provide at least a third-cousin match to nearly every
person in the population and a second cousin match for nearly 65%.129 For
individuals of Northern European ancestry in the United States, one of the most
tested groups, this database needs to reach only approximately three million
individuals, a result Erlich found not only foreseeable, but imminent.130
Moreover, to test the risks of re-identification from supposedly deidentified genomic data, Erlich endeavored to identify an individual from the
1000 Genomes Project, a publicly accessible data repository that de-identified
data in accordance with federal law.131 To study the specific risks of direct-toconsumer genetic testing, the data file was reformatted to emualte direct-toconsumer companies.132 Researchers knew only that the individual was a female
Utah resident with Northern and Western European ancestry.133 The file was
uploaded to GEDmatch and, within an hour, an ancestor was directly identified

124. See Andrea Grillo, Lucia Salvi, Paolo Coruzzi, Paolo Salvi & Gianfranco Parati, Sodium Intake and
Hypertension, NUTRIENTS, Aug. 21, 2019, at 1.
125. Dankar et al., supra note 122.
126. Id.
127. Ajunwa, supra note 90.
128. Id.
129. Yaniv Erlich, Tal Shor, Itsik Pe’er & Shai Carmi, Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using LongRange Familial Searches, 362 SCI. 690, 690 (2018).
130. See id.
131. Id. at 691.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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using publicly available genealogical records.134 Within a day, they had a name
for the “de-identified” individual.135
The harms of a breach of genetic privacy cannot be overstated. DNA is one
of the most stable identifying metrics in the natural world and is capable of
identifying familial relationships after 3,000 years.136 Individuals taking a
genetic test without adequate safeguards are not only putting themselves at risk,
but also their parents, relatives, and future offspring. For example, there are
founded fears that if an individual were to gain unfettered access to a genetic
database, they would be able to engineer a crime scene by planting synthesized
genetic evidence.137 Accordingly, because genomic data is unlike any other
biometric data, it warrants heightened scrutiny and consideration under relevant
privacy law.
II. CURRENT REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
The advancements in genetic sequencing and understanding should be
lauded. However, as Senators James Jeffords and Tom Daschle observed at the
start of the genomic era, “[w]ithout adequate safeguards, the genetic revolution
could mean one step forward for science and two steps backwards for civil
rights.”138 This Part examines the regulatory safeguards that are currently in
place and their shortcomings. Notably, some states have tried to take action
through stopgap measures, but with the extensive sharing of information
between entities and national distribution of direct-to-consumer companies, it is
widely believed that a federal solution should be in place.139
134. Id. at 692.
135. Id.
136. See generally Zahi Hawass, Yehia Z. Gad, Somaia Ismail, Rahab Khairat, Dina Fathalla, Naglaa Hasan,
Amal Ahmed, Hisham Elleithy, Markus Ball, Fawzi Gaballah, Sally Wasef, Mohamed Fateen, Hany Amer, Paul
Gostner, Ashraf Selim, Albert Zink & Carsten M. Pusch, Ancestry and Pathology in King Tutankhamun’s
Family, 303 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 638 (2010) (describing the genetic analysis of Ancient Egyptian pharaoh
Tutankhamun and five generations of relatives who lived from 1550–1479 B.C.E.); Verena J. Schuenemann,
Alexander Peltzer, Beatrix Welte, W. Paul van Pelt, Martyna Molak, Chuan-Chao Wang, Anja Furtwängler,
Christian Urban, Ella Reiter, Kay Nieselt, Barbara Teßmann, Michael Francken, Katerina Harvati, Wolfgang
Haak, Stephan Schiffels & Johannes Krause, Ancient Egyptian Mummy Genomes Suggest an Increase of SubSaharan African Ancestry in Post-Roman Periods, 8 NAT. COMM’NS 1 (2017) (using DNA to establish the
familial and ancestral histories in mummies from the first millennia B.C.E.).
137. Dan Frumkin, Adam Wasserstrom, Ariane Davidson & Arnon Grafit, Authentication of Forensic DNA
Samples, 4 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 95, 95 (2010); Andrew Pollack, DNA Evidence Can Be Fabricated,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/science/18dna.html.
138. James M. Jeffords & Tom Daschle, Political Issues in the Genome Era, 291 SCI. 1249, 1249–50
(2001).
139. See Colin McFerrin, DNA, Genetic Material, and a Look at Property Rights: Why You May Be Your
Brother’s Keeper, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 967, 987–90 (2013) (detailing Alaska’s Genetic Testing Statute
and Massachusetts’s Genetic Bill of Rights); see also Juan Pablo Sarmiento Rojas, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing: Rethinking Privacy Laws in the United States, 14 HEALTH L. & POL’Y BRIEF 21, 34–35 (2020)
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A. HEALTH INFORMATION PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996
The Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 is a
federal regulation which advances a Privacy Rule to protect and maintain the
confidentiality of a medical patient’s individually identifiable health
information.140 In order to effectuate this goal, the law takes a “covered entity”
approach. Under the law, covered entities are healthcare providers (e.g., doctors,
clinics, psychologists, pharma, etc.), health plans (e.g., insurance companies),
healthcare clearinghouses (i.e., an entity that processes healthcare information
from one of the other covered entities), and any business associate who helps a
covered entity carry out its healthcare activities and functions.141 A HIPAA
violation can result in civil or criminal liability and is only enforceable by state
prosecutors and the Department of Health and Human Services.142
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule sets restrictions on sharing patients’ protected
health information (PHI). PHI is any health care information that can be traced
back to individual patients and there are limited circumstances regarding when
and with whom it can be shared.143 HIPAA did not explicitly designate genomic
data as PHI until 2008.144 PHI can be shared from one covered entity to another
covered entity for activities defined as “health care operations.” Even then, only
the minimum information necessary for the operation at hand may be
disclosed.145 The definition of healthcare operations includes patient case
management and contacting health professionals about treatment alternatives.146
Additionally, the Privacy Rule bans a covered entity from selling PHI to any
third party for that party’s own use.147 Any other disclosure requires patient
authorization.148
HIPAA’s Privacy Rule does not restrict the use or disclosure of deidentified data.149 Under the statute, there are two methods by which PHI can be

(discussing the Alaska Genetic Privacy Act, California Genetic Nondiscrimination Act (CalGINA) & California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)); Kristi Harbord, Genetic Data Privacy Solutions in the GDPR, 7 TEX. A&M L.
REV. 269, 281 (2019) (advocating for a GDPR-style federal regulation).
140. Privacy in Genomics, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/aboutgenomics/policy-issues/Privacy (last updated Apr. 27, 2021) [hereinafter Privacy in Genomics].
141. Covered Entities and Business Associates, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/covered-entities/index.html (last updated June 16, 2017)
[hereinafter Covered Entities and Business Associates].
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2018).
143. Privacy in Genomics, supra note 140.
144. Infra Part II.B.
145. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(4) (2020).
146. Id. § 164.506(c)(5).
147. Id. §§ 164.501, 164.508(a)(3); see also Marketing, supra note 78.
148. Understanding Some of HIPAA’s Permitted Uses and Disclosures, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM.
SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/guidance/permitted-uses/index.html (last visited
July 31, 2022).
149. Privacy in Genomics, supra note 140.

August 2022

DOES ONE SIZE FIT ALL?

1781

designated as de-identified: by expert determination or by the statute’s “Safe
Harbor” provision.150 When de-identifying through expert determination, a
qualified individual uses statistical and scientific principles to remove
identifying features to the degree that any anticipated recipient of the
information could not identify the individual.151 The de-identification protocol
under the Safe Harbor provision involves the removal of eighteen types of
identifiers, supposedly resulting in no actual knowledge or residual information
that can be used to identify the individual.152
HIPAA fails to provide adequate protection from direct-to-consumer
genetic testing companies for two reasons. First, direct-to-consumer genetic
testing companies are not covered entities, and thus are not subject to regulation
under the law. Second, even if these companies were covered entities, the Safe
Harbor provision allows DNA to be classified as “de-identified,” contrary to
biological possibility, and thus still escape regulation.
Direct-to-consumer companies are not covered entities because their
relationship to their customers is not initiated by a healthcare provider. In fact,
the protection of this status is one that 23andMe, the only company with an FDA
approved medical test, goes to great lengths to preserve.153 When a genetic
counselor recommends a test for their patient, rather than ordering the test
themselves—the routine practice for medical genetics evaluations—23andMe
uses an affiliate link, so that the consumer is the one who “orders” the test.154
This preserves the direct-to-consumer relationship and prevents the company
from being required to comply with HIPAA.
Even if direct-to-consumer companies were considered covered entities,
because of the Safe Harbor provision, genomic data can still be considered deidentified. As the De-Identification Paradox teaches, this de-identification is
biologically impossible. Identity can be confirmed with as few as thirty to eighty
singular polymorphisms.155 Moreover, numerous studies have shown that “deidentified” genomic information can still be easily traced back to an
individual.156
Because of the covered entity approach and the Safe Harbor provision,
HIPAA does not provide adequate protection of genomic privacy in general, and
especially from direct-to-consumer companies.

150. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.514(b)(1), 164.514(b)(2) (expert determination and safe harbor, respectively).
151. Id. § 164.514(b)(1); see also Guidance Regarding Method for De-Identification, supra note 120.
152. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2); see also Guidance Regarding Method for De-Identification, supra note 120.
153. See Getting Started., 23ANDME, https://medical.23andme.com/dna-kits/#getting-started (last visited
July 31, 2022).
154. Id.
155. Dankar et al., supra note 122.
156. Supra Part I.D.2.
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B. GENETIC INFORMATION DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2008
The first federal regulation to directly protect against discrimination based
on genetic status is the Genetic Information Discrimination Act of 2008,
commonly referred to as GINA.157 When passed, Senator Ted Kennedy praised
the law as “the first civil rights bill of the new century of the life sciences.”158
GINA protects individuals from discrimination by employers and health insurers
when purchasing insurance.159 Congress enacted GINA to alleviate concerns
about the potential for genetic discrimination and to spur individual participation
in genetic research and testing on the then new frontier.160 Further, GINA
amended HIPAA to explicitly define genetic information as health
information.161
GINA uses a two-prong approach for regulation, with Title I containing the
health-insurance provisions and Title II containing the employment
provisions.162 Title I is enforced by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS), the Department of Labor, and the Department of the Treasury,
whereas Title II is enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).163 Notably, only Title II provides a private right of action and thus is
limited to the employment discrimination context.164
Despite its initial acclaim, GINA confers minimal privacy protection to
citizens due to significant limitations.165 Besides being limited to the purchase
of insurance and employment discrimination, GINA only applies to employers
with more than fifteen employees; does not extend to life, long-term care, and
disability insurances; and does not apply to the military and Indian Health
Service.166 Additionally, GINA does not apply if the individual is symptomatic
for genetic illness.167 Further, in a subsequent publication regarding the history
157. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008). See generally
Louise Slaughter, Genetic Information Non-Discrimination Act, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41 (2013).
158. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, Kennedy, Enzi, Snowe
Celebrate
Passage
of
Genetic
Information
Nondiscrimination
Act
(Apr.
24,
2008),
https://www.help.senate.gov/ranking/newsroom/press/kennedy-enzi-snowe-celebrate-passage-of-geneticinformation-nondiscrimination-act (quoting Senator Kennedy (D. Mass.)).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-53.
160. Slaughter, supra note 157, at 56.
161. Genetic Discrimination, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/aboutgenomics/policy-issues/Genetic-Discrimination (last visited July 31, 2022).
162. Slaughter, supra note 157, at 56–57.
163. Genetic
Information
Discrimination,
EQUAL
EMP.
OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/genetic-information-discrimination (last visited July 31, 2022).
164. 29 C.F.R. § 16351.1(a) (2021).
165. Slaughter, supra note 157, at 56.
166. Id. at 57, 59.
167. See Adam Rogers, The House Health Plan Makes Your Genes a Preexisting Condition, WIRED (May
4, 2017, 7:55 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/house-health-plan-makes-genes-preexisting-condition/.
However, this limitation is blunted in the insurance arena due to the Affordable Care Act (ACA); Harbord, supra
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and passage of GINA, former representative Louise Slaughter acknowledged
that direct-to-consumer genetic testing presents a challenge to GINA that
legislators could not have foreseen at the time of passage.168 Former
Representative Slaughter also defended GINA’s shortcomings by declaring that
“[j]ust as access to all civil rights developed in stages, a first step was taken with
the passage of GINA, but it was only the first step. Clearly more work is needed
to protect the American people.”169 Unfortunately, Congress has not taken the
additional steps needed to protect Americans.
C. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
The FTC regulates direct-to-consumer genetics testing only insofar as it
runs afoul of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.170 Section 5 of the
FTCA concerns unfair or deceptive trade practices.171 Under section 5, an act or
practice is unfair if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers
which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed
by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.”172 Additionally, the
FTC interprets section 5 to prohibit false or misleading claims about companies’
privacy or security protections, and that a failure to employ reasonable security
measures likely causes substantial consumer injury.173
A notable example of this interpretation is an action against Genelink, Inc.
and Foru International Corp. for marketing skincare products and nutritional
supplements purportedly based on the consumer’s genetic profile while failing
to take adequate precautions for consumer privacy. Among other claims, the
company marketed its products as capable of overcoming a consumer’s genetics
to treat diabetes, heart disease, and insomnia.174 More than that, the FTC also
alleged deceptive and unfair security practices when the company, despite
claiming reasonable and appropriate security measures, failed to use readily
available security measures to even limit wireless access to their network.175
This led to genetic information, social security numbers, bank account
note 139, at 284; see also Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
168. Slaughter, supra note 157, at 64.
169. Id. at 59.
170. Regulation of Genetic Tests, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.gov/aboutgenomics/policy-issues/Regulation-of-Genetic-Tests [hereinafter Regulation of Genetic Tests] (last visited July
31, 2022).
171. Id.
172. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018).
173. Regulation of Genetic Tests, supra note 170.
174. Companies Pitching Genetically Customized Nutritional Supplements Will Drop Misleading Disease
Claims: GeneLink, Inc. and Former Subsidiary Also Agree to Improved Safeguards of Consumers’ Sensitive
Medical Information, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 7, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/01/companies-pitching-genetically-customized-nutritional-supplements.
175. Id.
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information, and credit card numbers being susceptible to attack.176 When
discussing the case, Jessica Rich, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer
Protection, said, “[i]t doesn’t matter whether the claims deal with the benefits of
direct-to-consumer genetic testing or the privacy of personal information. It’s
against the law to deceive people about your product and to make promises you
don’t keep.”177 This quote is prescient, because it illustrates that FTC
enforcement and regulation can only reach the direct-to-consumer genetic
testing sphere when the company misrepresents its products and the benefits
they may confer.
Unfortunately, the FTC has to catch companies in a lie.178 This represents
a significant limitation on the FTC’s enforcement capabilities, especially
considering that companies can just be vague in revealing their privacy policies
or may bury them in lengthy terms and conditions hoping no one will read
them.179 On this predicament, Rebecca Lipman, a privacy expert and senior
counsel for the New York City Law Department wrote, “[i]f users do not do their
homework on what information [companies] are collect[ing] about them, and
the [companies] are not foolish enough to outright lie about what they are doing,
the FTC’s ability to control how companies share our data is very limited.”180
Looking specifically at 23andMe, Kayte Spector-Bagdady, a lawyer and
bioethicist at the University of Michigan said, “[i]f you read the documents
carefully, all the information is there. They really do disclose it all. The
challenge is people don’t read it.”181
Simply burying the risks in the terms of service is insufficient to protect
the consumer. It is widely known that most people do not read a company’s
privacy policies, despite agreeing to them.182 In fact, this phenomenon has been
coined “[t]he Biggest Lie on the Internet.”183 A 2016 study found that 74% of
users skip reading a privacy policy entirely and simply accept it.184 The study
additionally found that 97% of users agreed to privacy policies after scanning it
over for only thirty seconds.185
While this study focused on social media companies, direct-to-consumer
companies also employ the same use of clickwrap and browse-wrap
176. Id.
177. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 174.
178. Rebecca Lipman, Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for Our Data, 120 PENN ST. L. REV. 777,
789–90 (2016).
179. Id. at 790.
180. Id.
181. Molteni, supra note 93.
182. Jonathan A. Obar & Anne Oeldorf-Hirsh, The Biggest Lie on the Internet: Ignoring the Privacy Policies
and Terms of Service Policies of Social Networking Services, 23 INFO. COMMS. & SOC’Y 128, 129 (2018).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 135.
185. Id. at 141.
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agreements.186 Moreover, the terms of service are usually written at college
reading levels—beyond the scope of the average consumer.187 Experts have
questioned whether consumers can “fully or partially understand DTC-GT
[direct-to-consumer genetic testing] compan[ies’] consumer policies and
agreements even when consumers take time to read them,”188 especially when
those terms regard the complicated underlying science of genomics. This means
that companies do not have to lie; they can simply bury the truth in their terms
of service and know that customers will either not read or understand it. Because
of this, FTC regulation and enforcement are inadequate in protecting the
American consumer.
III. PROPOSED REGULATORY SOLUTIONS
Congresswoman Slaughter said that GINA was only the first step; this Part
proposes the next steps the Federal Government should take to ensure that
American consumers’ genetic privacy remains intact.
A. THE “COVERED ENTITY” APPROACH SHOULD BE OVERHAULED, AND A
COVERED INFORMATION APPROACH INCLUSIVE OF ALL MEDICALRELATED PHI SHOULD BE ENACTED
The first step in protecting consumers’ genetic privacy is amending
HIPAA’s covered entity approach, extending the statute’s coverage to entities
transacting in personally identifiable health-related data. As described in this
Subpart, due to the nature of the covered entity approach, direct-to-consumer
genetic testing companies fall outside the scope of healthcare privacy
regulation.189 This proposed amendment would bring direct-to-consumer
genetic testing companies within the purview of HIPAA, the law that regulates
privacy for medical records.
This proposition is intuitive, because the genetic data derived from a
genetic counselor and the genetic data derived from a direct-to-consumer
company are the exact same: the patient-consumer’s DNA. Additionally, this
approach makes sense, because direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies
are carefully watched by the FDA, as evidenced by its intervention in 2010.190
Moreover, the FDA actively regulates 23andMe—the direct-to-consumer
company with the most diverse product offerings—because it is a medical
diagnostic company.191 Because of the covered entity approach, 23andMe does
186. Rachele M. Hendricks-Sturrup & Christine Y. Lu, Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing Data Privacy:
Key Concerns and Recommendations Based on Consumer Perspectives, 9 J. PERSONALIZED MED. 25, 27 (2019).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See Covered Entities and Business Associates, supra note 141.
190. Pollack, F.D.A. Faults Companies, supra note 112, at B2.
191. Id.
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not need to protect their consumer’s records at the same standards as medical
genetics companies. This is a loophole that must be closed.
This approach has been implemented elsewhere by the European Union’s
General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR).192 The GDPR covers the collection,
processing, and sharing of any personally identifiable data of any nature.193 The
GDPR is an incredibly broad regulation that is outside the scope of this Note.
However, this Note is not advocating for the wholesale import of the GDPR
or the regulation of a specific type of actor. Rather, this Note is advocating for
only the adoption of the GDPR’s approach of regulating a specific type of data.
This approach should also be limited to the regulation of health data in the
United States.
The exact definition of health data is left to Congress but should at least
include genomic data. The danger of this approach is that an overly broad
definition of health data additionally sweeps up fitness apps and other companies
that transact in certain health metrics, such as blood pressure machines in local
pharmacies or heart-rate fitness monitors. Thus, the definition of health data
should be carefully drafted with such potential consequences in mind.
If the covered entity approach is abandoned and replaced with a health data
standard, companies will be unable to avoid medical data privacy laws solely
because of a direct-to-consumer relationship. This is important, because a directto-consumer relationship with a provider ultimately should not be discouraged.
The direct-to-consumer model may promote the democratization of healthcare,
but there must be adequate safeguards for patient privacy. This is the right first
step.
B. SAFE HARBOR OR FALSE FLAG: WHY THE SAFE HARBOR PROVISION
SHOULD EXPLICITLY EXCLUDE GENOMIC DATA
The second step to increasing consumer protection is to specifically exempt
DNA and genetic data from HIPAA’s Safe Harbor provision. This step is the
simplest of potential reforms. As the De-Identification Paradox shows, it is
biologically impossible to de-identify genetic data.194 Because of this biological
impossibility, entities should not be able to follow a set list of steps for deidentification, snap their fingers, and pretend the data is anonymized. The
science is unambiguous.195 Genomic data that has been de-identified can still be
imputed back to the source. Moreover, the Erlich study found this identification

192. Matt Burgess, What Is GDPR? The Summary Guide to GDPR Compliance in the UK, WIRED (Mar. 24,
2020, 4:30 PM), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-gdpr-uk-eu-legislation-compliance-summary-fines2018.
193. Id.
194. See supra Part I.D.2.
195. See Erlich et al., supra note 129, at 692; see also Ajunwa, supra note 90.
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can occur in a day’s work.196 Erlich—the Chief Science Officer of MyHeritage,
one of the top four direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies—has called for
increased data privacy regulations regarding the sharing of genomic data
because of the ability to reidentify so easily.197 Excluding genomic data from the
Safe Harbor provision is the simplest way to strengthen genetic privacy.
C. GIVE THE LITTLE PERSON A SWORD: HOW GIVING CONSUMERS
OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR DATA AND THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN CAN
EMPOWER CONSUMERS AND ALLAY PRIVACY CONCERNS ON AN
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL
The third step is to empower consumers with a right to be forgotten. Simply
declaring genomic data as identifiable is not enough, as there are still enhanced
privacy issues surrounding the nature of this data, as well as unforeseeable risks.
Congress should empower consumers to take ownership of their genomic data.
Given the inextricable and permanent link between an individual and their
genome, they should be given pseudo-ownership of the data and records that
contain the information. One way to convey this pseudo-ownership would be to
institute a right to be forgotten, a right to correct incorrect data, and a right to
demand a list of anyone who has had access to the data. These various rights are
not new in the spheres of privacy. The rights to be forgotten and to rectify
incorrect information are already instituted in the European Union’s GDPR and
the California Consumer Privacy Act.198 Moreover, the right to demand access
to a list of all individuals who have accessed a patient’s data is already present
in HIPAA.199 The Federal Government needs to make these rights undeniably
clear and bring them under one roof.
A right to be forgotten means that a consumer could force a company to
delete their data and, in the genetic testing context, destroy their biological
sample. This would allow the consumer to get their test results and receive
whatever knowledge they desired. If that were the end of the road for them, the
consumer could print the report and exercise their right to be forgotten. This
does more than just protect the consumer by giving them a powerful tool to
protect against exploitation. This is important because the “biggest lie on the
internet” is that consumers generally do not read the terms of service or privacy
policies.200 For direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies, those terms of
service are typically written at higher reading levels than the average consumer

196. Erlich et al., supra note 129, at 692.
197. See id.
198. Burgess, supra note 192; CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(c) (West 2020).
199. See Your Rights Under HIPAA, U.S. DEP’T OF HEATH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/forindividuals/guidance-materials-for-consumers/index.html (last visited July 31, 2022).
200. Obar & Oeldorf-Hirsh, supra note 182, at 144.

1788

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:6

on subject matter that is incredibly complicated.201 Moreover, even the most
educated geneticists admit there are risks to genetic testing that are currently
unforeseeable. The risks are unforeseeable because of the Sharing Paradox: as
more genomes are tested and researched, more associations will be made. Even
if consumers read the terms of service, the full ramifications and risks of their
actions may be unknown for years. Because of these unforeseeable risks,
consumers deserve to have an emergency exit. At a minimum, a right to be
forgotten will give consumers a way out if they were to ever decide the juice is
not worth the squeeze.
The right to be forgotten would also act as a check on the direct-toconsumer genetic testing companies and incentivize increased privacy
protections. Recall that direct-to-consumer testing companies have two
significant sources of revenue: the sale of genetic tests and the sale of the genetic
data to third parties.202 Additionally, this secondary revenue source is extremely
profitable: 23andMe has made at least $360,000,000 this way.203 The scale of
this secondary revenue stream is massive, and companies will likely enact many
changes to protect it. If consumers had a right to be forgotten, they could place
an incredible amount of pressure on companies to safely protect consumer data.
Unlike the other reforms suggested—which rely on pressure from the
government to guide company policies—a right to be forgotten empowers the
individuals whose data is being exploited. It gives the consumers a sword.
The biggest issue with this reform is that it will disrupt the economic
calculus of direct-to-consumer genetic testing by directly challenging the
companies’ business model. However, this argument is easily rebutted because
the direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies are free to set their prices in a
manner the market would support. Moreover, it is important to remember that
HIPAA tightly restricts the sale of PHI and bans its sale to third parties for their
own uses.204 Therefore, it is likely this revenue stream is only possible because
of the current loopholes in the United States’ regulatory regime. Finally, HIPAA
and other consumer protection laws do not exist to open the market to
exploitation; they exist to protect patients and consumers from exploitation.
Thus, any regulatory regime should center patient-consumer privacy and let the
market work out a suitable price after.
A right to be forgotten would inevitably change the economic calculus for
direct-to-consumer companies. However, economic considerations do not take
the driver’s seat when it comes to protecting patient privacy, and companies are

201. Hendricks-Sturrup & Lu, supra note 186, at 2.
202. Allyse et al., supra note 74.
203. Herper, Surprise!, supra note 91 ($60,000,000 from Genetech); Molteni, supra note 93 ($300,000,000
from GlaxoSmithKline).
204. 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.501(a)(1), 164.508(a)(3)(i)(B)(ii) (2020).
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always free to raise their prices. A right to be forgotten would give consumers a
check on a secondary revenue stream that exploits their own data, allowing them
to protect themselves from unforeseeable future risks.
CONCLUSION
There are legitimate concerns surrounding genetic privacy and the uneven
patchwork of its regulation. Genomic data is inextricably linked to an individual
and their relatives, and thus can never be divorced from the individual’s identity.
In fact, genomic data can even be traced back several generations past a mortal
life.205 Currently, federal regulations allow the sharing of de-identified data and
consider genomic data as being capable of de-identification despite that
biological impossibility. Moreover, some of the most prolific genetic testing
companies—those that offer the services without a relationship to a patientconsumer’s healthcare practitioner—are able to dodge the privacy regulations
regarding identifiable data protections. Even the most educated actors in the field
admit that the potential risks involved with genetic privacy are unforeseeable.
An overhaul needs to occur, and it is long overdue. The clock is ticking, and
action must be taken before it is too late.

205. Erlich et al., supra note 129, at 692.
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